gagementwith the fabular,along with its contemporary fabulization,means that it is fabled in and by law. Thoughi ts peakst ot he fable in its allegoricals ense, completewith talking animals -and afabulous creature -this is afabulous case for other reasons entirely. It speakst ot he common law'sp ractice of extracting lawa nd legal principles from av ibrant and livede xperience that is rendereda carapace, based on the premise that the principles containedi nc ases speak for themselvestime out of mind. Decided in 1908, it is still good lawin2015 (having not been overturned by legislation or later judicial decisions), and it is read as if it werepart of the here and now.Despite this, the casenow standsonlyfor principles supported by abare and scant background known as the "facts" (the material circumstances which animate legal principles and thus the law), which are more or less unmoored in time and space, but which are taken to be interpretatively completebecause they relyu pon the rhetoric of reason and rationality -unpolluted by the seeming irrelevance of the narrativethat nests within the text of the case. However,t he "facts" are an ecessary component and supplement to the common law'si nterpretative requirements, yett his does not stop the lawb eing fabled. Fort he continued presenceo ft his exemplary case "raises and complicates questions of exemplarity,r hetoric, and power […] e xemplify [ing] , as Louis Marin argues, the wayi nw hich narrativesl ay traps for readers. The simplicity of the fable masks and reveals the complex rhetoricalo perations of 'fabula.'"⁶ This playo ffabula is the jester'st rick.You might have noticed as urplus of fables so far in this introduction, denoted through the stylistic and typographical convention of the italic, apractice marking words as foreign.⁷ Yetn one of these fables are foreign, though all are fabulous. Even seemingly invented words are real. The derivation of the wordi st he key,b ecause fables are nothing other than stories.And stories,for arationalworld at least,are inherentlyuntrustworthy, defined variouslyasa"fictitious narrative or statement; astory not founded on fact,"⁸ which "speak falsely, talk falsehoods, lie," that "fabricate, invent (an says reconsidering the roleo ft he Roman exemplar and roleo fe xemplarityi na nd around law against the post-Enlightenment negation of the exemplar in favour of the abstract.  MarcRedfield, "Fables of Responsibility:Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (review)," Modern Language Quarterly .  ():  -, .  The italic formed the typographical enigma used in TheDaVinci Codecase, Baignent &Leigh vThe Random House Group Ltd []EWHC .AsPeter Goodrich notes,the devicewas simplyu nobserved by those reading the case: Peter Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law: Obiter Depicta as the Vision of Governance (New York: Cambridge University P, ),  -.  "Fable, n." OED Online. OxfordU niversity Press,October .Web. (last access October , ). incident,apersonage, story,e tc.)."⁹ Fabulousness is defined to mean a "proneness to fictiono ri nvention," and thus includes a "foolisho rr idiculouss tory; idle talk, nonsense."¹⁰ This wordi su nforgiving: "to take (something) for fable or to holda tf able,"¹¹ (from the Old French tenir af able),¹² is to be gulled, or to be fooled. There is nothing fabulous about this state of affairs at all, for to be fabulous in this sense is "of adoctrine, error, or notion:Based on or originating in fable or fiction."¹³ We,too, are fabled, but not in agood sense. We are discombobulated, gulled, madef oolish, exposed as making thingsu p, to be taken for fable. To think of the fable as an egative is the very form of fable itself, through its etymologya nd morphology. We fable when we make thingsu p, invent,when we are fooled and when we are foolish.
There are more, manym ore varieties of fable, but that is as good ap lace to stop as any, because we getthe picture. We might not have meant to, but we have fabled the text if we interpolated the allegorical fable in the place of that other fable, the fable that is fiction and lie. Lawyers fable the lawoft he past through the common law'sp rivileging of abstraction as the basis of rational law, in the practices that assume that the imposition of rules and formal legal interpretative devices,s uch as the rules of statutory interpretationo rstare decisis,a ct as bulwarks against the possibilityofu nreason or judicial inventiveness, or the possibility of fabling.¹⁴ Fort hese reasons,a mong many,l aw pays nearlyn oa ttention to its own historicization, its materialities,p referringt ob elievet hat the reduction of the narratives and circumstances into bare rules and principles achieves aformal legality.Law pays little or no attention to the possibility that those rules and principles might be affected by the loss of knowledge of narrativesa nd circumstances, and paradoxicallyr esults in the formation of fabulous law. Nor do legal actorsa lways realize that they,too, are historicized, and thatt hey too will Fabulous Law: LegalF ables inevitablyfable lawand the readingofcases by imposingthe lens of the present onto the lawoft he past.The fabulous case to be considered later in this collection makes just this point.
FaireS avoir
The possibility that lawyers might fableb ecause they are bound up in and through the world they inhabit (or that we might need to engagew ith worlds that have been lost), thati sf rom outside and beyond the limits of lawi sb oth unthinkable and fabulous, as the OxfordEnglishDictionary's etymological examples of the word fabulous reveals. The Dictionary uses examples from two heroes of the common law, Hobbes (1588 -1679)a nd Paine (1737-1809), to illustrate how that which is fabulous -superstition and irrationality -Iisseemingly remedied by the forces of reason and rationality (and establishing fundamental, foundational stories of lawa long the way). So the Dictionary drawso nH obbes' Leviathan,p ublished in 1651 in these terms: "T. Hobbes Leviathan iv.x liv. 334 Their fabulous Doctrine concerning Daemons."¹⁵ And nearly1 50 years later,i n 1794,t he Dictionary illustratest he negative connotation through the title of Paine's: "The Ageo fR eason, being an investigation of true and of fabulous Theology."¹⁶ Fabulous,y es, but these fabulous definitionsc ould not be further from our present dayconception of the word. Fordespite the traps and warnings alreadya ctivated, if we hold onto the carapaceo faword, we fable (in its negative sense) if we read these delightful sentences to invoke the fabulous of everydayparlance, to mean wonderful or marvellous or special, àlaAb-Fab, itself Absolutely Fabulous.¹⁷ These are not wonderful doctrines, or marvellous theologies, but fictitious, foolish, invented, anti-empiricist and anti-rational doctrines and theologies. Law'sf aith in the anti-fabulous is, however,m isplaced, because that which is seemingly rational and reasonable, removed of Daemons and Theologies, is as capable of being as negatively fabulous as thatw hich it overcame. QED; if lawyers do not look beyond what is assumed in the text of long-standing principles found in case law, then we fable the lawinunexpectedways. Rationality and reason is no bulwark against fabulous readings of the texts of law through the unintentional agencies of law'sa ctors.
 The Leviathan is central to Derrida'sa rgument: Derrida, Beast and Sovereign;deV ille, "Deconstructingt he Leviathan"  "Fabulous, adj."OED Online.  Absolutely Fabulous,a vailable at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolutely_Fabulous( last access February , ).
Derrida, too, understood the wont of fabulous fable, recognisingand understanding that fables have multiple, perverse meanings, through the inversion involved in the construction of knowledge,and how it might be subverted or contorted through the process by which meaningiscreated. Derrida understood that fables make meaningt hrough their faire savoir,¹⁸ that is that they make, meaning,orastranslatedliterally, "make to know."¹⁹ Derrida'sconception of the faire savoir is not unidimensional however,and needstobeunderstood in two different registers. The first of these is anodyne, the faire savoir as the didactic fable of the kind that reveals itself as the expectedn otion of fable as story,m oral, parable.²⁰ The second form through which Derrida conceiveso ff able is through both aliteral and afigurative shift of emphasis as the "faire" savoir,which is of a different order of fable entirely, involved in:
"making like" knowledge ["faire" savoir], i. e. givingt he impression of knowing, giving the effect of knowledge,r esembling knowingw heret here isn'tn ecessarilya ny knowing: in the latter case of fairesavoir, giving the effect of knowing, the knowingisapretendknowing,afalse knowing, as imulacrum of knowing, am ask of knowing.²¹ [mye mphasis in bold] This "making like" knowledge is the domain of the negative fable. While Derrida'sconcerns about "faire" savoir sits within the domains of power, "faire" savoir is preciselyt he form in which laws peaks when its actors fable, making like knowledge,aslegal fabulars, "anarrator or recorder of tales or fictions,"²² or fablers, "one who speaks falsely, al iar (obs.),"²³ who fabulates and fabulizes by "inventing,c oncocting and fabricating."²⁴ Of course,n ot all or even most,l aw is fabled, but thatlaw can be fabled by legal fab(u)la/e/rs reveals that lawisembodied, temporallya nd spatiallygrounded and actor dependent, for as Derrida observes, fables are nothing on their own:
 DrawingonMarin'searlier exploration of the roleoflaw and power throughthe fable: Louis Marin, Food for Thought,trans.MetteHjort (Baltimore&London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, ), xviii.  Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .  Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .  Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .  " † Fabular,n."OED Online. OxfordUniversity Press,October .Web. (last access October , ).  " † c. Fabler,n . "OED Online. (last access October , ).  "Fabulate, v." . "To invent,c oncoct,f abricate;"" †Fabulize, v."" To concoct,i nvent;" OED Online. OxfordU niversity Press, October .Web. (last access October , ).
What is fabulous in the fable does not onlydepend on its linguistic nature, on the fact that the fable is made up of words.The fabulous also engages act,gesture, action […] inorganizing, disposingdiscourse in such away as to recount,toput livingbeings on stage,toaccredit the interpretation of anarrative,tofaire savoir, to makeknowledge,tomakeperformatively,t oo peratek nowledge.²⁵ Words do not act on their own, nor does law. Law'sactors inevitablyare involved in "makingt ok now," but law'sp ractice is such that it deniest he possibility that law, with its techniquesg rounded in the assumptions that rationality and reason immunize law'sa ctorsf rom fabling, might result in "making like knowledge." Yetiti snot hard to find the negative legal fable, the "faire" savoir,ina ction, if youknow wheretolook, as the exemplary fabled case that Iturn to later in the collection reveals how the legal actor "makes [law]l ikek nowledge." To take us there, and to understand how abstract lawn eeds material narrative, we need to step, briefly, back into the domain of thato ther type of fable, and what it reveals of the trap into which law'sa ctors might fall, because of and not despite, the promise of reason and rationality.
The reason of the strongest is alwaysb est /
La raison du plus forte st toujours la meilleure
To be fabulose is to be "fond of fables,m yths, or enigmas."²⁶ If the traps placed for readersinthis chapter so far have not done their job, there are more to follow, includingwhat seems to be a volte-face,aturn to preciselythe form of fable that appeared to have been eschewed, the legal fable of the type identified at the beginning of this chapter.The reason can onlyberevealedlater,inevitably, through the kind of trap Marin identifiesasthe wont of the fable through the playoffabula. The title of this sub-headingc ontains the first words and the moralo fL a Fontaine'sf able, ²⁷ "The Wolf and the Lamb,"²⁸ first published in 1668. Thisi s the samef able referred to at the start of this chapter and though La Fontaine's is one of the best known versions, the fable has circulated since "Aesop."²⁹ Even if we know nothing of it,t here is something about the title of the fable that givesusclues,the proximity of the words wolf and lamb speaking to an inevitability thatisunlikelytorefertothe promise that "The wolf also shalld well with the lamb."³⁰ We are expected to know thats omething awful is most likely going to happen in the lines of this fable, but La Fontaine'sopening words -the reason of the strongest is alwaysbest -appear at odds with afable about animals whose likelye nd will result because of their relative inequities of power and strength. Wolves eat lambs, so the call to reason, and the couplingo fr eason with strength seems odd, but the words recall and echo thoseofaLatin version of the fable by the Anglo-Norman poet Walter,titled "De Lupo et Agno,"³¹ whose "resigned moral [… says] 'Thus the harmful one hurts the harmless,and invents ar eason for harming.'"³² Fora sS hawp uts it: "In the final lines, the creatures' conflict is resolveda sp redictablya nd as unfairlya st he opening moral leads us to expect."³³ The opening words of La Fontaine'sv ersion of the fable have been called "bitterlyi ronic and stated ap riori,"³⁴ as ad enial of justicet hrough power and force.³⁵ But Marin,u sing the "elaboratelyt uned instrument of both practical and theoretical reason" (invokedb yt he use of the word "reason" in the fable), reads these opening words as something else again, that its grammara nd logic inevitablym eans that the reader has to accept their truth, thatt he reason of Fabulous Law: Legal Fables the strongest is best,³⁶ thatt he wolf exercises power preciselyb ecause it is the strongest,³⁷ and thats trength comes about through law:
Violence will always lie at the origin of law; power will always be the basis of morality;and lawand morality will never be anythingbut justifications of power.Unabletomake justice strong,mankindensured that powerwas made just […]The discourses of the wolf and the lamb proves the truth of [the opening] words,w hilet he story simplys hows the saying's veracity.³⁸ Marin'sextensionofthe moral into this considerablywidenedreach can onlybe found by reading the fable through the insights of the contemporaneous text, ³⁹ the 1662 Logic of Port-Royal.⁴⁰ Marin'sreadingisgrounded both within the problems that the Logic sought to understand along with the critical dimension contained within the devices La Fontaine'sdeploys in the fable itself. The [originally anonymous] priestlya uthorso ft he Logic brought "the Augustiniant radition to its culminationwithin the Cartesian épistémè,"⁴¹ bringingspeculative knowledge into 'adoctrine of morals teachingthe proper conduct of life and actions'."⁴² The melding of two distinct discourses to form "agrammarand alogical system that is simultaneouslya ne thics and, vice versa, an ethics that is simultaneouslya logical system and ag rammar,"⁴³ the Logic brought "scientific knowledge and the moral knowledge within the same rational economya nd method."⁴⁴ The logic of the Logic necessarily "involved the possibility of articulating ap ropositional logic of judgment together with adiscursive ethics thatwould aim to regulate 'thosee rroneous readings that occur in civill ife and ordinary speech'."⁴⁵ Marin'ss tarting point is that the fable problematizes questions of ethical virtue and moral obligation, includingt he obligation that the reader faces.H e argues thatb yl eaving readings open that include the possibility that power can be moralized as ad iscourse of justice, or justicef actualizedasp ower,there is an inevitable pull on the part of the reader,who is caught by its opening call to reason, amplified by its insistence thati ti st he reason of the strongest that is "best":⁴⁶ Itst heme is the conflict between fact and value, between an objectively established given and an ethical and ideal teleology.This is aconflict encounteredbyamoral subject, acting within the sphereofpractical reason. It is aconflict that has to be workedout and resolved within the conduct of life.⁴⁷ Through his intricate semiotic decoding of the fable, using the means and practices of the Logic and its associated grammar, ⁴⁸ we understand that the talking animals, wolf and lamb,are cyphers:the wolf represents the state of nature,the little lamb civilsociety,culture, and law(as well as the inevitable representation of innocencea nd theological references that abound in the imageo ft he lamb), that they are more than creatures of unequals trength and power.⁴⁹ The state of nature in the fable is ap lace of universal warfare "governed by brutef acts and sheer power relations […]astate of nature unrestricted by sanctions or obligations, ar ealm governed by the physical necessities of sheer power relations."⁵⁰ It is inevitable that the little lamb, accidentlye ncountering the wolf, constructs cogent,reasoned arguments that she has done no wrongagainst him by drinking from as tream, but he asserts sovereignty and power over her nonetheless. Reason might be the best gesture through which to understand how to act,b ut it fails the lamb. The wolf makes ac laim in property,a nd establishes as eries of wrongs for which the lamb must take the blame,⁵¹ despite being an ew-born. The wolf dispatches her regardless: Sans une autre forme de procès (without  Marin, Food for Thought, .  Marin, Food for Thought, .  Marin, Food for Thought,  -.  Marin, Food for Thought,  -.  Marin, Food for Thought, .There is somethingofH obbes' stateo fn atureh ere, but Marin reads the relationships theologically, that the wolf is authorized to act through at ranscendent power,e xpiatingi ts guilt in exercisingp owero vert he lamb:M arin, Food for Thought, . Fabulous Law: Legal Fables any( other) form of trial);⁵² "cette expression remontea uX VIe siècle, où les condamnations àm ort étaient légion, et qu'elles avaientl ieu après une parodie de procès."⁵³ This reference to ashow trial is aclue which reveals that something more is going on in this fable than can be explained through reason and logic, or the pull solelyo fat raducingofr ationality and reason. Though not perhaps directlyr eferencingthe formal, political show trials of sixteenth-century France, we are left in no doubt that lawhas failed the lamb,and thatitisthe wolf'sclaim to power through property that is the reason for this travesty of justice. What is not obvious, for those of us from another time and place, and for whom the imageofthe political show trial of the ancien régime and the themes of sovereignty,p ower and in/justice inherited through Derrida (and Marin),wef ind ourselvesr eading the fable through that filter,tothe exclusion of alost,though much richer,site of attack -that of everydaym aterial law, the actions of property owners, and the role of lawyers.
ForL aF ontaine has larded the fable with local, everydayl aw,a nd its problems and injustices are encoded in its tropes and images and words and arguments, which is not altogether surprising because La Fontaine, the fabulist, was alsoalawyer.⁵⁴ But of course, none of this is clear on its face. We need guidance to understand the fable in these terms,t or ead beyond abstract ideas of power and sovereignty and injusticet of ind the localized harms of lawt hat have been lost from view.W ef able La Fontaine'sb arbs if we onlyr ead them as an account of abstract power,a nd through am aterial readingo ft he fable, through accounts of the operation of lawa nd justicei ns eventeenth-century France, that we find that La Fontaine has am uch smaller targeta ts take than  Carla Freccero, "ARace of Wolves" in Animots: Post Animality in French Thought: Yale French Studies Number ,eds.Matthew Senior,David L. Clark, and Carla Freccero (Yale: Yale University Press, ):  -,  -.  Colloquially "without further ado"; "the term dates to the sixteenth-century,w here death sentencesw erel egion, takingp lacea fter as how trial" [myt ranslation]a vailable at: http:// www.linternaute.com/expression/langue-francaise//sans-autre-forme-de-proces/century (last access June , ).  Anumber of referencesindicatehewas legallytrained. "Entre  et ,JeandeLaFontaine est àP aris où il étudie le droit[ … ]a vec Maucroix et Antoine Furetière" -Between  -,J ean de La Fontaine was in Paris where he studied laww ith Maucroixa nd Antoine Furetière [myt ranslation]: Biographie de Jean de la Fontaine,a vailable at: http://www.la-fontainech-thierry.net/biographie.htm (last access June , ),. An English version says in  "He is back in Paris with his friends Maucroix and Furetière and has begun to studylaw.Hebecomes a barrister in ," available at: http://www.musee-jean-de-la-fontaine.fr/jean-de-la-fontainepage-uk- - -.html (last access June , ).
we realize. And that property owners, and lawyers who support thosep roperty owners, are the purveyors of profound, localized injustice -through manifestations of power.
David Parker describes the practices of lawa nd justice in seventeenth-century France in these terms: "It would be difficult to find am ore ingenious legitimization of the civil and legal inequalities inherent in the structures of the French state,"⁵⁵ than through the administration of lawand justice, in particular through its operation at alocal level. If anything manifested "social and civil inequalityt hrough legal privilege, [it was] best reflected perhaps in the idea that litigants oughtt oa ppear before their natural judges."⁵⁶ Al amb ought to appear before the wolf, her natural judge,just as atenant would be judgedbytheirlandowner, their natural judge,a nd so on, up the chain, ac laim to jurisdiction over their dependents whether based in laworotherwise, thatisthrough claims made in power alone, and not lawParker turns to Jean Bacquet's1688 Traité des droits de justice, haute,m oyenne et basse,⁵⁷ along with other contemporary legal commentators,t op aint ap icture of the forms of localized power claimedb yl andowners in the century leading up to the French Revolution. It revealed thati n the absenceo ff ormal legal basesf or the invocation of jurisdictional claims by landowners over tenants,f ictitious devices designed to claim jurisdiction were used as amatter of course. These were, in effect,actions outside law, and ranged from simplyc laiming the power to "institute aj udge, ap rocureur fiscal,aclerk and sergeants,"⁵⁸ or by asserting that actions were "dominial," such as imposing fines without appeal for non-payment of dues,⁵⁹ as an exerciseo fp ower absent law.
Even more striking is Parker'sobservation that: "all [the contemporary] writers […]a gree that justicew as ap atrimonial right and could be boughta nd sold,"⁶⁰ and that despite the shift to am ore centralizeda dministration and rationalization of lawd uringt he seventeenth century, "the persistent perception of the interdependence of rights of property and those of justicew as not diminished by the continual alienationofroyal rights in both."⁶¹ Networks of privilege and connection resulted in the manipulation of the judicial system,⁶² but in any case:
The jurists and legal practitioners of the dayw erem orei nterested in the distribution, administration and execution of justicet han in the enunciation of abstract principles about its source; when they did focus on this question, their frame of reference was ad ivinely ordained universe in which power, wealtha nd status wered ispersedi nh ierarchical fashion.⁶³ Knowingthis,LaFontaine'sfable can never look the same again. It is not simply or solelyadisquisition on the operation of abstract ideals of justicel evelled against an absolutist monarch, but ac riticism of the operation of lawa ta local, material level. The lamb'sf ate speaks to and is directed towards forms and practices of localizedinjustice, the stuff of the everydaylaw under ajudicial system grounded in power and privilege. The wolf'sa ctions are no different to the kinds of behaviour of the landowners of seventeenth-century France, who assumed preciselythis kind of wrenchingpower over their tenants,the wolvesmeting out injusticeo vert heirl ambs.
The fable historicized reveals that whatever political concern animated La Fontaine, he was also attacking everydaylegal practices based in and attaching to power thatc omes with property;h is elegant alexandrines speaking to forms of elegant modes of lawabsentjusticeand thus enacting the expectations of the Logic,through the languageofrationalityand reason. In doing so, he was thus speaking to his own propertied readers who were themselvest he self-same distributors of laww ithout justice; we have to remember that fables were not the stuff of children'sl iterature, but directed towards adults and their morality. In speaking to those who held property in the ancien régime,wes ee the fable directed towardssomething much more material and less abstract than we imagine of La Fontaine'sb arbs.
 Parker, "Lawi nS eventeenth-Century France," .  Parker, "Lawi nS eventeenth-Century France," .
3. "Thus the harmful one hurtst he harmless, and inventsareason forh arming."
La Fontaine was continuingatradition. Another earlier fabulist (who was also possiblyalawyer), the fifteenth-century Scottish poet Robert Henryson,⁶⁴ had said more-or-less the same thing to property owners and lawyers in ahighlybarbed glossheappended to his version of the fable. He did not let the fable speak on its own, adding in clear words the moral of the fable (perhapsnot trusting the fable to be interpreted by law'si nterpreters), to make amplyc lear its message and its target. He spoke plainlya nd directlyt ol awyers, courts and the propertied, that is, to those who had the power to, and could, act against their tenants,⁶⁵ whose actions amounted to those of nothing other thant hoseo ft he wolf against the lamb.H enryson chided them for pursuing thoseo fu nequal means for the smallest of breaches, and who used lawn ot to achievej ustice, but to extend and expand theirw ealth, using lawt op usht heir tenants out of their dwellings and land.⁶⁶ Rather than making his point through the rationality of La Fontaine'se legant alexandrines, Henryson uses verse to ensure that his coda reiteratest he fable'smessage. As Wang puts it: "Through deft handlingofpoetic style, Henryson achieves through pathos what might be impossible through logic alone:h e moves readerst op ity society'sl ambs, despise its wolves, and envision social change[ … ] " : ⁶⁷ The poor folk, then, this Lamb mays ignify, Like cottars, pedlars,a nd such labouringm en; Their life is half ap urgatory aye, Even with honest work, as we wellk en. The Wolf stands for extortioners,who then Oppress such poor folk, as we often see, By violence, or by guile and subtlety. 
